(COINTELPRO TODAY) Policing Terrorism in the United States: The Los Angeles Police Department's Convergence Strategy

You thought COINTELPRO was dead? Think again.

This article was taken from The Police Chief Magazine, and internal law enforcement journal. It speaks to the targeting of specific organizations in particular the Black Riders Liberation Party. We can connect this also to the case of Alex Sanchez. Please read carefully, fascism is already here and has been here.

To highlight some things from this article:

"Black Rider Case: The Black Rider Liberation Party, a spinoff of the Black Panther Party, threatened to take over four police stations in Los Angeles and shoot and kill as many police officers as possible in furtherance of its black separatist and antigovernment agenda. Traditional policing tactics, including surveillance (using both technical and nontechnical methods), source development, search warrants, and the introduction of an informant, resulted in the arrest and prosecution of this domestic terrorist group. Property recovered during the investigation included numerous large-caliber automatic and semiautomatic weapons; a military handbook on intelligence and interrogation; night vision goggles; bulletproof vests; knives; a crossbow; a police scanner; and manuals on police field operations, sniper procedures, and bioterrorism."

Free Alex Sanchez and all political prisoners! Support those coming under attack by the state!










Policing Terrorism in the United States: The Los Angeles Police Department's Convergence Strategy

By Michael P. Downing, Deputy Chief and Commanding Officer, Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau, Los Angeles, California, Police Department




ocal law enforcement agencies around the world face an increasingly complex set of problems with the emergence of globally coordinated criminal networks and national security threats. Modern-day criminals have proved themselves to be transnational in reach, linked by sophisticated networks and highly adaptive in their thinking. In response, local police agencies such as the Los Angeles, California, Police Department (LAPD) are developing strategies that are equally adaptive and networked. The linchpin of these strategies is and must remain convergence.
The word convergence is used variously by different disciplines. In this context, the intent is to describe the process of bringing different elements together to achieve a result beneficial to all. As a real-world example, the U.S. Army’s Human Terrain Project (http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/) puts anthropologists and other social scientists alongside combat units in Afghanistan and Iraq to help the military better understand local cultures.
This concept translates well to policing in the context of counterterrorism. To face a relatively new adversary, police have been required to bolster old strengths, such as investigative skills, while acquiring new information, such as specific knowledge of terrorist organizations. These developments are fostered often by collaborative, multidisciplinary environments, which can cast light on the way forward. This article highlights some of the efforts the LAPD has undertaken to achieve a high level of convergence in working to prevent terrorist activities on U.S. soil.

A New Reality: Global Events with Local Effects

For local police to successfully meet the challenges posed by terrorism, the time-tested approaches that emphasize prevention must converge with new ones that focus on prediction. The systems designed to protect sensitive information must converge with efforts to cooperate and collaborate with law enforcement partners in the United States and abroad. Self-contained, territorial methods of operation must give way to strategic relationships and the development of an international consciousness that remains anchored in local communities.
In relation to terrorism, these strategies are driven by a new reality: extreme ideologies often have global implications. The groups that hew to these ideologies and embrace the use of violence can achieve a global reach. The impact of this new reality is that terrorist attacks can have devastating effects on the United States and its interests—no matter where in the world such attacks occur.
Local law enforcement agencies in the United States must assume that an attack that takes place in a remote location could be part of a global effort with a local operational component. The attack could be replicated locally, could be supported or advanced by local operators, or could even be exploited by local extremists to advance their political agendas. Therefore, it is essential that local law enforcement agencies start to look beyond U.S. shores for the harbingers of future regional issues.
Two examples of geopolitical changes in the past several years demonstrate the need to appreciate international perspectives. According to World Bank estimates, the number of poorly governed “fragile” states—those characterized by weak institutions and vulnerability to conflict—jumped from 17 in 2003 to 26 in 2007.1 This is significant because failed states can serve as breeding grounds for criminals such as terrorists, who are all too eager to exploit a weakened government and population and who often develop transnational reach. In terms of tactics, it is interesting to note that suicide attacks took place in seven countries from 1981 to 2000. The number of countries has jumped to at least 20 since 2001.2 Although it is not a foregone conclusion that the United States will suffer a suicide attack, this is a trend that merits the close attention of the law enforcement community.
Already, the United States faces a vicious, amorphous, and unfamiliar adversary. In simplistic terms, the terrorist threat can be separated into three categories: homegrown terrorists inspired by an ideology promoted by al Qaeda or other groups; terrorists who come to the United States to raise money to conduct operations here or abroad; and terrorists who have footholds both in the United States and overseas and operate in both arenas.

In the experience of the LAPD, the principal threats are local, self-generating, and self-directed. If there are direct connections with overseas groups, these are most likely to be initiated by the local actors. One such example was found in Lodi, California (see figure 1 for a timeline of terrorist activity since September 11, 2001), where U.S. citizens sought terrorist training in Pakistan. This consideration is not intended to minimize the international threat, but it serves as a caution that the number of U.S. local threats will likely increase.

Figure 1. The graph illustrates that over time, terrorist attacks have become more inspired
by rather than controlled by al Qaeda. For U.S. law enforcement agencies, this means a
greater emphasis must be placed on identifying homegrown, al Qaeda–inspired terrorists and
developing a greater understanding of the local environment that produces them.

Strengths of Local Agencies in Counterterrorism Efforts

The United States has many more layers and jurisdictions than countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Israel, and Australia. One need only look at the numbers. Covering 3.79 million square miles and home to more than 300 million people, the United States contains roughly 3,000 counties and about 2,500 cities with 10,000 or more people.
The country boasts more than 16 federal intelligence agencies and 17,500 local law enforcement agencies that employ more than 750,000 local law enforcement officers. This decentralization of law enforcement responsibilities presents both a challenge and an opportunity: a challenge to develop lasting, effective collaboration among diverse agencies, but an opportunity for special skills and expertise to be developed and shared throughout the U.S. law enforcement community. Whether that opportunity will be realized will be decided by how effectively agencies collaborate—with each other, with the private sector, with academia, and with their communities.
The strengths of U.S. local law enforcement agencies are drawn from the powers of search, seizure of evidence, and arrest; a community policing infrastructure; the growing ability to manage, share, and analyze information; the proven ability to identify and interpret suspect behaviors; and established relationships that can carry an investigation from inception to completion.
Local police also add the critical elements of speed, resources, and numbers to any situation. They are able to deploy rapidly and can quickly summon more forces if needed. Managers in the field are accustomed to making decisions in dynamic and high-stakes incidents. Investigators, particularly in large police departments, have considerable resources at their fingertips and are supported by a solid investment in their training. Many police departments throughout the country are faced with a high workload. The natural outcome of this fast pace is that the officers and investigators have substantial breadth and depth of field experience.
These strengths all make local police supremely capable of being valuable contributors to U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Just as terrorists’ modus operandi evolve, so do policing efforts. Police are designed to quickly adapt and align their resources to changing circumstances in the field. They are also the force most attuned to subtle changes and warning signs in the community.
In the terrorism arena, the main strength of local agencies is their experience in investigating individuals and enterprises. The investigation of individuals has created a robust understanding of how broad networks and enterprises with varying degrees of culpability are linked through relationships. The crime-fighting model used to investigate organized crime, gangs, and narcotics trafficking enterprises—their structures, the players, and their strategies—is being applied regularly to the investigation of terrorist networks.
This modern approach was embraced after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in recognition of the dearth of information about other possible terrorist activity in the country. Agencies following the model cast a wide and deep law enforcement net that both attempts to catch culpable individuals and targets the larger enterprise. Resources are focused on detecting more traditional crimes such as fraud, smuggling, and tax evasion to assemble the puzzle pieces and understand the networks of terrorist operatives in local communities. This approach has helped agencies develop a richer picture of the operational environment and likely has played a significant role in preventing another attack in the United States.
The convergence of these tried and true policing strategies when applied to the problem of terrorism has yielded success. Local police, particularly those from the larger antiterrorism units, are contributing to the knowledge base of their state and federal colleagues—particularly when it comes to understanding the dynamics of networks and decentralized groups. These cases and the resulting lessons learned have increased the stature of local law enforcement operations and earned local agencies a legitimate seat at the intelligence table.

Progress since September 11

In the past, turf battles and the need for jurisdictional supremacy at all levels of the U.S. law enforcement community led to key intelligence failures. Although there is still much work to be done, in the last seven years, information sharing in the United States has improved both vertically and horizontally: vertically, meaning between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the nation’s 17,500 state and local police departments, and horizontally, among the state and local departments themselves. The changes made in communication between local and national intelligence units since the September 11 attacks can be put into three categories: culture, capability, and awareness.
Culture: Local and state law enforcement agencies are now recognized as critical to intelligence efforts to prevent terrorism—efforts that blend seamlessly with their core mission to detect and deter crime and protect communities. This was not always so. Only after the September 11 attacks were these agencies woven into the national security fabric, and the art of policing was acknowledged and embraced. The change in the culture has been reflected in numerous documents, studies, and initiatives in the past seven years, including the president’s National Strategy for Information Sharing and a recent RAND Corporation study that stated that “policing and intelligence should be the backbone of U.S. efforts” to defeat al Qaeda because its network of individuals needs
to be tracked and arrested.3
Capability: Analytic capabilities have improved in large part because of the establishment of 58 fusion centers in 46 states.

Awareness: Local police are becoming better able to recognize behaviors consistent with the crimes related to terrorism.

Role of Local Agencies in Intelligence Gathering and Analysis

As the U.S. government and federal law enforcement agencies have embraced police as true partners, local law enforcers themselves have rallied. For the first time in U.S. law enforcement history, senior officers from every major city police intelligence unit in the nation have come together to form an Intelligence Commanders Group (ICG), part of the Major Cities Chiefs Association. Major city police departments are those that employ more than 1,000 law enforcement officers and serve a population of 500,000 or more. The 64 top-level intelligence commanders that constitute the ICG work in concert to share intelligence and ensure interagency cooperation.
In May 2008, this group delivered a position paper, Twelve Tenets to Prevent Crime and Terrorism, that detailed the priorities of local law enforcement agencies.4 This paper addresses 12 issues ranging from the classification of intelligence documents to the federal grant process and calls for changes in all.
The ICG document is a prime example of how police are collaborating in new ways to influence homeland security policy at the federal level. Their newfound voice is coupled with a desire to consider thoughtfully all of the serious responsibilities that come with their role as “first preventers” of terrorism—particularly when it comes to intelligence gathering and sharing.
With an increased role in the intelligence arena comes the increased responsibility on the part of police to protect civil liberties and operate in a legitimate and transparent fashion. The growth of intelligence-gathering operations at the local level must be proportionate with the creation of safeguards against abuses. It is important that local law enforcement agencies carefully and accurately define those they suspect will commit a criminal terrorist act. This task must be executed with a balance and precision that inspires the support and trust of the U.S. population so that local residents will partner with the police in the pursuit of their lawful mission.
The support and the trust of the public are essential to “softer” law enforcement strategies aimed at countering extremist ideologies and influence at the local level. Although the primary objective remains to hunt terrorism suspects and disrupt their operational capability (that is, recruiting, funding, planning, surveilling, and executing operations), the broader strategy must include efforts that target terrorists’ motivations.
Outreach and partnership efforts aim to increase the safety and stature of communities to create a network of individuals who feel it is in their best interest to create an environment hostile to criminals of all stripes. Such a network can be achieved by providing excellent police service and building solid relationships with community members.
This point is not merely an academic one—it has operational consequences. By getting communities, including those that may be breeding grounds for violent ideologies, to buy into the idea that local agencies are operating in the communities’ best interests, these agencies foster an environment in which tips and leads can come from those same communities, increasing the ability to gather information. Ultimately, it is these communities—aided by law enforcement and other resources—that foster environments hostile to the proliferation of criminality in any form.

Recent LAPD Counterterrorism Cases

The LAPD created its Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau in 2003. It now has close to 300 officers dedicated to counterterrorism, criminal-intelligence gathering, and community mobilization efforts.
The LAPD Counter-Terrorism Bureau’s mission has four goals:
Prevent terrorism by effectively sharing information aimed at disrupting terrorists’ operational capability and addressing the underlying causes associated with the motivational component

Protect the public and critical infrastructure by leveraging private-sector resources and hardening targets

Pursue terrorists and the criminal enterprises that support them

Prepare the citizenry and the city government for consequences associated with terrorist operations against the city
The LAPD has gained considerable counterterrorism case experience over the past few years. The following cases are but a sample of those that have come onto the LAPD’s counterterrorism investigative radar.
Hezbollah Funding Case: The arrest of a major terrorist funding group by a task force comprising members of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and the LAPD working alongside the FBI illustrated the interrelation of criminal acts and the funding of terrorism, as well as the increasing global reach of local cases. This group raised money for Hezbollah by selling narcotics. It then laundered a portion of the funds by selling counterfeit products such as clothing and cigarettes in the United States and Latin America.
Black Rider Case: The Black Rider Liberation Party, a spinoff of the Black Panther Party, threatened to take over four police stations in Los Angeles and shoot and kill as many police officers as possible in furtherance of its black separatist and antigovernment agenda. Traditional policing tactics, including surveillance (using both technical and nontechnical methods), source development, search warrants, and the introduction of an informant, resulted in the arrest and prosecution of this domestic terrorist group. Property recovered during the investigation included numerous large-caliber automatic and semiautomatic weapons; a military handbook on intelligence and interrogation; night vision goggles; bulletproof vests; knives; a crossbow; a police scanner; and manuals on police field operations, sniper procedures, and bioterrorism.
Jam’yyat Al-Islam Al-Saheeh: One case serves as an excellent example of the prison radicalization process, the nexus between street-level crimes and terrorism, and how homegrown terrorists are often inspired by ideology and events overseas but have no affiliation with a larger terrorist organization. It also illustrates how local police are key to identifying terrorism suspects who were not previously on the federal law enforcement radar.
Kevin Lamar James was a former Hoover Street Crip gang member who, while in prison, founded a group called Jam’yyat Al-Islam Al-Saheeh (JIS). While serving a 10-year sentence for robbery and possession of a weapon in prison, James converted a fellow inmate who, once released in 2004, was instructed to recruit others for terrorist operations against the United States and Israel. The convert did as instructed; in 2005, the four-person cell actively started researching such targets as military installations, Israeli offices, and synagogues and funded its operations through a series of gas station robberies—all orchestrated by James from behind prison walls.
One of these robberies led to the cell’s discovery and capture by local police in the summer of 2005. The search warrant that resulted from the robbery of a Torrance, California, gas station led to the discovery of jihadist propaganda and an overarching conspiracy to wage war against the United States. The four men involved were indicted in October 2006. Three of the four, including James, have pleaded guilty. The fourth was found mentally unfit to stand trial and is in a federal prison facility under psychiatric care. One of the four—the man whom James sent out to recruit others—was the first to be sentenced, receiving a 22-year federal prison term in June 2008. During his sentencing hearing, Levar Haney Washington told the judge that the members of JIS waged war against their own country because they opposed U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and stated that “calamities affecting the Muslim world” had influenced his outlook. The cell had robbed gas stations because oil is a political symbol, he said.5
Animal Liberation Front: The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) is an extremist group whose members have committed arson, vandalism, and other crimes that often do not rise to the level of a federal violation—placing them directly in the wheelhouse of local law enforcement agencies. The leaders of this underground movement often cloak themselves in the protections of the First Amendment right to free speech while leading a criminal lifestyle, committing crimes such as petty theft and robbery to sustain both themselves as individuals and the larger criminal enterprise. This rejection of authority enables local agencies to track and ultimately catch the leadership culpable for more pedestrian crimes such as burglaries. The ALF’s ultimate objective is to eliminate animal euthanasia and the use of all animals in laboratory testing in universities and science centers. In the pursuit of these objectives, elements of the group have become more violent.
California Department of Motor Vehicles: Another case provides an example of a crevice criminal market—in this case, embedded in a trusted government institution—that provides the logistical support for lower-level crimes all the way to potential terrorism-related cases. Workers at the California Department of Motor Vehicles provided a significant number of suspects with false documents. The documents in question appeared legal in every way other than the assumed name. This enterprise is in the process of being disrupted and dismantled through such traditional policing methods as extensive investigation and using informants against the targets.

LAPD Counterterrorism Programs
Even as the LAPD gains valuable real-world experience through cases such as those mentioned in the previous section, it must keep improving its capabilities and methods to stay ahead of the threat. The LAPD must also continuously develop ways to forge partnerships and foster collaboration among agencies. Sun Tzu, the oft-quoted Chinese general from the sixth century, wrote that “if you know your enemies and you know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles.”
The following programs (some of which are identified in figure 2) demonstrate just some of the areas in which the department has concentrated its efforts to achieve its ambitious goals.

Figure 2. The graphic depicts a convergent approach to information/intelligence
collection that feeds into operational decision making, both in terms of
critical operational decision making and deployment or tactical resource allocation.
The double-sided arrows illustrate the fact that in this system, intelligence can feed operations or operations
can feed intelligence collection requirements.

Suspicious Activity Reports: The LAPD developed and implemented the Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) process for reporting suspected terrorism-related incidents and tying them firmly into information collection procedures, tracking systems, and intelligence analysis. This is considered the first program in the United States to create a national standard for terrorism-related modus operandi codes. The SAR program is an example of the convergence of skills that police have used for decades to observe traditional criminal behavior with the new behavioral indices of those associated with terrorist recruitment and the planning and execution of operations. This initiative, which fits nicely with the federal government’s National Strategy for Information Sharing, is in the process of being rolled out nationally. Once the SAR program is institutionalized throughout the country, local, state, and federal agencies will have a common standard for collecting, measuring, and sharing information about suspected terrorism-related incidents. This program has the potential to become the bread and butter of U.S. fusion centers, and it can inspire the so-called boots on the ground and the community to get involved in the counterterrorism effort.
Operation Archangel: More than 85 percent of the critical infrastructure in the United States is privately owned. In partnership with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the LAPD implemented Operation Archangel, which has become a national model for critical infrastructure protection. This program, which represents convergence of the private sector with the police system, was recently documented in the award-winning film Archangel: Protecting Our Freedom, which was distributed to 64 major cities and to the U.S. Congress.
National Counter-Terrorism Academy: The LAPD pilot tested the National Counter-Terrorism Academy (NCTA), the first such academy created by local law enforcement agencies for local law enforcement agencies. During the five-month pilot program, which ended in July 2008, nearly 60 police, fire, and private security personnel from 25 agencies received a comprehensive overview of international and domestic terrorist threats and were aided in the development of intelligence-led policing (ILP) strategies to counter those threats in their jurisdictions. This multiagency, multidisciplinary student body served as a prime example of the convergence of various disciplines in the counterterrorism effort. The NCTA will train many more in 2009, with NCTA programs in Los Angeles and elsewhere in California. The LAPD has also formally proposed the creation of a National Consortium on Intelligence-Led Policing (NCILP) that would serve as an ILP training and education resource for state and local police departments across the United States. The NCILP would design five separate curricula to teach state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies how to apply ILP strategies to the fusion of intelligence on counterterrorism, narcotics trafficking, gangs, organized crime, and human trafficking.
Hydra: The LAPD facilitated the acquisition of a training system, called Hydra, that tests and improves the decision-making skills of agency personnel during simulated critical incidents. This will be the first Hydra system in the United States and will grant the LAPD access to the training scenarios of 32 other installations throughout the world. In doing so, the department will firmly converge its training efforts with those of major police departments in such countries as Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom.
Terrorism Liaison Officers: Terrorism liaison officers (TLOs) are casting an ever-wider net to train more people in the city as public data collectors. They are trained on what and how to report suspicious behavior/activity that has a nexus to terrorism. This is one prong of an effort to institutionalize counterterrorism awareness in the area commands and throughout the LAPD. The ultimate goal is to blend crime-fighting and counterterrorism efforts seamlessly.
Muslim Forum: The LAPD recently held its first-ever Chief’s Muslim Community Forum, hosted by Chief William J. Bratton. This meeting brought police and Muslim leaders from throughout the greater Los Angeles area together to enable the LAPD to better understand how it can protect and serve their communities. The LAPD is in the process of developing a documentary film that will highlight the diverse Muslim communities in Los Angeles, their relationships with local law enforcement agencies, the challenges faced by both U.S. Muslims and law enforcement agencies, and the way forward. Community mobilization, an essential part of the crime-fighting model, is particularly important when applied to populations that may feel targeted by society or the police. One goal with Muslim communities has been to converge their community-building efforts with those of the LAPD; by opening channels of communication and fostering trust, opportunities to improve police service to those communities would arise.

Additional Capabilities

The following list enumerates some of the LAPD’s capabilities that best enable it to work toward its goal of convergence.
Information Sharing: Working in concert with regional and federal partners in the seven counties served by the Joint Regional Intelligence Center, the LAPD continues to build its capacity to collect, fuse, analyze, and disseminate both strategic and operational intelligence (see figure 3). The LAPD is aligning the information collection and dissemination process with an eye toward accountability to ensure that “first preventers” have the needed information in a timely manner. The “all crimes, all hazards” approach to this center ensures analysts’ ability to bring to light relevant trends to generate actionable intelligence. This fusion center epitomizes the model of convergence.

Figure 3. This graphic illustrates the LAPD’s preventive and predictive model of intelligence
collection and distribution. The LAPD’s Counter-Terrorism Bureau’s Major Crimes Division
and Emergency Services Division, as well as the Joint Regional Intelligence Center and
the Real-Time Analysis and Critical Response Division, create a real-time, four-lane
superhighway of information and intelligence. The CompStat process, criminal and
intelligence investigations, crimes that provide funding mechanisms for terrorist networks,
and technology that provides even more
focused information all provide for a richer
picture of local intelligence

RPPICS: The LAPD has developed a technological tool, called the Regional Public Private Infrastructure Collaboration System (RPPICS), that enhances communication both within the LAPD and with the private sector. This program converges technology with the goals of hardening targets and the inclusion of the private sector in counterterrorism efforts.
Human Intelligence: The LAPD created a human source development unit to increase its ability to develop actionable intelligence in specific areas—a measure taken with an eye toward understanding the environment of homegrown extremists and what to target in that environment.
Intelligence Investigators: The pioneering of the Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section demonstrated the success of a hybrid model of cross-training that equipped intelligence officers with the tools traditionally available to analysts. The new model requires that each investigative team be responsible for producing link charts, timelines, financial analysis, and so on. This helps investigators to see the criticality of analysis by identifying their own knowledge gaps and adjusting their investigations accordingly. This new approach has shortened the time span from the identification of a problem (a terrorist indicator) to its representation (in the form of analyzed intelligence) and the realization of investigative goals.
Cyber Investigations: The LAPD has developed the ability to hunt for signs of radicalization and terrorist activities on the Internet—a capability that provides a plain-view means of identifying and gathering information on potential threats. Information gleaned from this open source, fed into the radicalization template, and combined with a thorough understanding of operational indicators is critical to articulating suspicion and justifying the increased application of enforcement measures.

Conclusion

U.S. local law enforcement agencies have come a long way in terms of adapting to the increasingly complex threats of today’s world. However, as terrorist groups embracing asymmetric warfare tactics attempt to create a larger footprint on U.S. soil, agencies must not grow complacent.
Police hold the key to mitigating and ultimately defeating terrorism in the United States. Local agencies throughout the country have the ideas and the technology to create counternetworks and to mount effective defenses and offenses. Through multijurisdictional, multiagency efforts, police can cast a redundant network of trip wires to determine whether individuals or enterprises represent an active threat that warrants investigation or enforcement action. But agencies will need to be flexible, adaptable, and transparent enough to collaborate with one another. They will need to develop more meaningful and trusting partnerships and to create policy that maximizes law enforcement resources. Most importantly, they will need to work with communities to counter the extremism that foments acts of terrorism. Policing must be a convergent strategy that fights crime and disorder while creating hostile environments for terrorists.
The theme of convergence illustrates the coupling of local resources, namely police, with the ability to recognize ordinary crimes that terrorists have been known to commit in preparation for their operational attack: committing traffic violations, obtaining fake identification papers, smuggling, human trafficking, counterfeiting, committing piracy, drug trafficking, or participating in any other criminal enterprise that intersects with terrorists’ needs. Local police serve as the eyes and ears of communities; as such, they are best positioned to observe behaviors that have a nexus to terrorism. It has been the LAPD’s goal to institutionalize the idea of counterterrorism efforts throughout the department and the communities it serves—not to make counterterrorism measures the priority, but a priority.
Converging community policing and counterterrorism strategies and implementing them under the guiding philosophy of intelligence-led policing will focus law enforcement efforts and better equip agencies to partner with communities in the pursuit to make the United States safe. Ultimately, the success of all of these convergent strategies will be measured by the prevention of terrorist acts, the countering of extremist ideologies and their local influence, and the resiliency of U.S. communities in the face of man-made and natural disasters. ■
Notes:
1Karen DeYoung, “World Bank Lists Failing Nations That Can Breed Global Terrorism,” Washington Post, September 15, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/14/AR2006091401859.html (accessed December 23, 2008).
2Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random House, 2006).
3White House, National Strategy for Information Sharing: Successes and Challenges in Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing, October 2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/infosharing/index.html(accessed December 23, 2008); and Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2008), xvi,http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf (accessed December 23, 2008).
4Major Cities Chiefs Association, Homeland Security Committee,Twelve Tenets to Prevent Crime and Terrorism, May 2008,http://www.majorcitieschiefs.org/pdfpublic/MCC%20Twelve%20Tenet%20Final%205%2021%2008.pdf (accessed December 23, 2008).
5H. G. Reza, “Man Sentenced to 22 Years in L.A.-Area Terror Plot,” Los Angeles Times, June 23, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/23/local/me-cell24 (accessed December 23, 2008).
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From The Police Chief, vol. LXXVI, no. 2, February 2009. Copyright held by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, 515 North Washington Street, Alexandria, VA 22314 USA.
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